Gandhi made freedom a buzzword among the Indian people and demonstrated that subtle courage could shame the aggressor. However, he tested popular commitment through constant disappointments, like calling off agitations just when they were at their peak and staying passive when it would be expected of him to react.
Gandhi banked on public opinion, national and international, but he had the uncanny determination to overlook the opinion of the marginalized people even when he claimed to be their representative. This was the common complaint of some great contemporaries of Gandhi who broke away from him due to ideological differences.
Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League became strong where Gandhi’s Congress became weak; Jinnah and his kin became strong where Gandhi lost Subhash Chandra Bose, Ambedkar, Chhoturam, and ultimately Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. Certain historical episodes are underpinned by an apprehension that though Gandhi banked upon the support of the masses and villagers, and ran emancipation programmes for the harijans, he really cared for the industrialist and upper classes; he derived his strength from the masses but he favoured a small elite clique to whose desires the masses could be sacrificed.
The partition certainly dulled the aura he exuded and if he is to be credited with Indian independence can he be exonerated with the discredit of the partition: how could a man be so powerful and so helpless at one and the same time? Gandhi could sacrifice the nation to his principles -therein lay the seeds of Mahatma-hood and those principles to his dotage- therein lay the fallibility of a human.
Introduction
Gandhi gave a massive base to the freedom movement by unifying the masses under the banner of swadesi and giving them the more accessible weapon of ahimsa or non-violence. He told them that freedom could be got in a humble way.
Gandhi came up with ways of protest that were radical and relatively less tested and tried. In Indian context the experiments proved quite successful. He relied on the beneficence of the English in making his programmes succeed.
Gandhi had many constructive programmes under his sleeves and these worked to unify the masses- he had simple ideas that could work wonders in a nation that had limited resources. His teachings worked well in times of relative peace, strict surveillance and administrative hold but when the crisis of 1947 precipitated (this was not sudden or unexpected) the moral could not hold against the infernal tide of the times set in motion by Gandhi and his band of followers.
He wanted freedom and dignity as an Indian, secured and administered by the British. However, the Rajaji formula took Gandhi’s earlier experiments beyond its limit manifest as an ‘exchange of populations’ it proved to be a scourge for the nation and could not be monitored as Gandhi had irrationally(but may be true to his philosophy) hoped. Many leaders criticized Gandhi for dissimulating ignorance with regards to the bifurcation when the adverse consequences were all too predictable and in fact ‘Mountbatten Plan’ was called ‘Gandhi Plan’ by Lord Mountbatten himself.
There is inexplicable demonstration of haste in succumbing to Jinnah’s demands and Nehru’s ambition to head the respective parts they claimed. Gandhi seldom carried out his threats to the finale including his assertion that to build Pakistan he had to be destroyed first. C Rajgopalachari, Gandhi’s acolyte proposed the ‘two -nation’ theory towing Jinnah’s line. There is inexplicable demonstration of haste in succumbing to Jinnah’s demands and Nehru’s ambition to head the respective parts they claimed.
There was no consideration of masses that had placed their faith in the existing regional stalwarts and in Gandhi, not the two doyens Gandhi promoted. Punjab , Bengal , and the North-West Frontier Province were the provinces affected most by the vivisection. It is an irony that in fact it was the people of these two regions who had played the most active part in the nationalist struggle and it was these regions where Congress had never had a majority and perhaps, did not mind sacrificing to Muslim League. Muslim League, like Congress, was in minority here, but could justify their claims to Congress and British who were eager to resolve the issue but not the problem.
Both Nehru and Jinnah were thoroughly anglicized men and had only political connections with the grassroots. The British, Congress, Muslim League and their active heads were least concerned about the imminent violence that stared the people in their faces and more keen on sorting out personal ego–issues.
Gandhi’s consent to partition was a great shock Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ as Gandhi utterly undermined Ghaffar’s concerns in submitting NWFP to Jinnah’s charge.
After this decision, it was little surprise that Gandhi chose the riot affected Noakhali and not Punjab for his rescue mission. The masses had been sacrificed and they read it as a betrayal because the self-same Gandhi who had earlier asked them to bear the arms to assist the British, now asked them to surrender without complaint to a cruel neighbour. They could not understand why the motto of non-violence was always preached to the victim and never the perpetrator.
Zulus, Jews and now Punjabis had been alienated by his discourse or at least the importune moment of the discourse. What pretext was there to justify aggression and action when it was made on the side of the British and why this consistent lack of chastisement to Muslims and call to remain uncomplaining to Hindus? This inequity of treatment stressed a distinction between Hindus and Sikhs and Muslims which he should have desisted from. He should have spoken about humanity and underlined their common race, but he used community specific words and addressed them differently.
There are incongruities in his application of the principles: he seems to be too steadfast to morality in some contexts and takes a complete u-turn in other scenarios. His definitions of the same principles are sometimes employed to justify contrary stands: Zulu suppression, Gandhi-Irwin pact, Gandhi’s active support of the British in their war recruitment drive during the World Wars; lack of concern for the fate of Bhagat Singh and his friends; pacification of Jinnah with a handful of Muslims at his back; seeming support to sectarian Muslims in partition riots and a beleaguered Pakistan in the aftermath of partition.
His admiration of the English sometimes smacks of racism when he issues myopic statements about the humanitarian mission of the civilizing British. Gandhi knew he could make the nation dance to his tune and he understood where the British may perceive him as a threat and where an ally. Civil Disobedience movement was convened and called off in the consideration of a stray violent event to the disappointment of the people and the relief of the British.
Subhash Chandra Bose despite his election as a president of Congress had to resign as he could sense the overt and covert resistance that Gandhi offered to his programmes. He was forced to part ways and INA was the fortunate product of this parting of ways. The lore has it that had Gandhi supported INA rather than the British Army, India would have won a martial victory during the Second world war. Bose was a better leader and administrator than Nehru it was always felt.
Gandhi was a conservative who believed in a tolerant, humanitarian and all inclusive hierarchy. He believed in accommodation but not in segregation, while Ambedkar advocated recognition of what the post-structuralist critique will endorse as ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ and independent status of the depressed classes. Ambedkar’s view was that the vested interests of the outcastes differed from those of caste Hindus so Ambedkar demanded a distinct political status for the marginalized. Gandhi wanted to subsume them in the Hindu fold and was against a radical challenge to the Varna system- he endorsed Varna and its inherent hierarchy.
Gandhi was a past master in political stunts- he understood the power of the metaphor. He had agitprop weapons at his disposal that he could use in intelligent combinations to convey the importance he attached to a certain issue and could maneuver realities through symbolic actions: silent vows, hartals, hunger strikes, civil disobedience and non- cooperation worked for him. Gandhi had the whole nation at his beck and call and he did not shy away from testing this allegiance. His timing and choice was deliberate and significantly affected the outcome: against the partition of India he chose not to speak and he did not go on a hunger strike; against the aggression initiated by the Pakistani Muslim’s on their fleeing Hindu brethren he took a silence vow but he would not go on a hunger strike either; if , however, it was to protest against attacks on Muslims he could go on hunger strike and speak strongly against it; if it was a protest for immediate payment of financial share to Pakistan (even when the fledgling state was planning to wage a war o India ) he would again go on a hunger strike (and not silence vow) in which he could stress his demand to satisfy Pakistan. Gandhi’s decisions were conscientiously taken as could use silence as a weapon when he chose and desist from its use when he willed. The specific junctures where he chose to remain silent and abstained from food influenced the course of modern Indian history.
A great detractor, but necessarily obliterated from dominant historical discourse was Sir Chhoturam. Chhoturam hailed from a peasant family and grew up to be a messiah for the farmer in Punjab struggling under the twin assault of money lenders and the Raj. He had established the Congress at Rohtak in 1916 but split his way in 1923 after voicing reservations to a partial non-cooperation movement that he felt severely compromised the interests of the peasants. In those days, non-payment of taxes led to an usurpation of the farmer’s property by the government that usually auctioned it off to prosperous bidders.Gandhi refused to involve mill-owners, traders and money-lenders in the movement who would directly benefit from the punishment met out to the protesting farmers. He presaged an unsuccessful movement demaning farmers to be the sacrificial lambs and was against it- he felt that Gandhi protected and furthered the financial interests of the native exploiters and rich classes by not soliciting their support to the nationalist cause.
Sir Chhoturam, the doyen of Unionist Party, formed the provincial government in Punjab before partition and that was hugely popular in pre-partition Punjab . Chhoturam wrote a long letter to Gandhi criticizing his patronage to the CR formula and warned him about the prospective horrors that lay waiting for common people if credit was given to such a thesis as proposed therein. Here is an abridged translation of the letter:
The idea of mass exchange of population in the CR formulas is sheer madness. A large chunk of Muslims would be left in the Hindvi India and similarly, a great populace of Hindus would be left in Pakistani India . In this way the CR formula would not be able to meet out even the basic division of population on communal basis. It is not a solution, nor does this formula resolve the political deadlock. This formula in very near future is going to inflate the communal problem and entangle further the present conundrum.
Mr Jinnah would not accept this formula, even if it is partially altered. As it gives a strong basis to build the communalism claim on, he will use the formula and its other version to negotiate a better deal for the Muslim League.
If as proposed in this regard the mandate is reserved for one community with an exclusion of the rest, you would agree with me that it will be the last nail in the coffin of nationalism. In its present form the formula naturally creates segregation and the discrimination therein angers the non-Muslims of Punjab and Bengal .
Objections:
The formula presumes Jinnah’s contention that Hindus and Muslims are a separate race.
It is implicit in the formula that ‘dharma’ or religion which is a private issue and concerns the soul can be a basis of a Nation State, whereas in contemporary times the States are formed on secular lines.
· It has a covert text that majority religion should own the state and that minorities would have a subnational status.
· In Rajaji’s opinion Bengal ’s Hindus and Punjab ’s Hindus and Sikhs have been treated as movable property that could be bartered as per the wishes of the decision-makers.
· If Pakistan comes into existence Punjab and Bengal would be severely and immediately affected. Before ‘inventing’ it and prior to putting it before Jinnah for approval tha opinion and consensus of the people of these provinces was not taken and no discussion was held with them on this issue.
The proposal creates a life and death situation for Punjab ’s people and those who have put this question to Jinnah may be very honourable men but they know little of the evils of a religious state.
This formula conbsiders Jinnah as the sole representative of the Muslims and ignores those Muslims who have steadily supported Congress during worst communal ordeals, it leaves them to the mercy of wolves.
Consequences:
It will have far-reaching adverse effects:
1. This formula has been proposed at a time when Jinnah’s influence over Punjab and Kashmir has been severely undermined. It gives a new lease of life to him and buttresses his falling fortunes.
2.It disappoints non-communal people.
Conclusion:
You have accepted the wrong solution to the problem. It stems from hopelessness and partiality and it hardly gives a sufficient cause to be relieved from British sovereignty. Your excitement to get rid of the British raj is commendable but you are subject to self-deception. This chosen way would help the British scheme for leaving the nation in doldrums. In return, India would come in the intolerant grip of religious apparatus.
The solution does not conform to your theory of satyagraha.
Sir Chhoturam recommended that Jinnah should be discouraged and delineated a strategy whereby this could be successfully done, namely, asking him to give a well- defined socio-economic programme for the new proposed state of Pakistan; people’s feelings given due weightage; Indian strategic response discouraging those who opt for Pakistan. He asked for politics based on economic interests and giving up of Pacifist practices.
Chhoturam started a blitzkrieg campaign to sensitize people against the scourge of communal rift, he died in 1945 and India never woke up from the nightmare of communal hatred after his untimely demise.
There was also a man who never complained but whom Gandhi utterly disregarded in his haste to satisfy Jinnah’s ambition.This was Frontier Gandhi of the Pathans who now turned against their beloved leader as they felt deceived and subordinated to Jinnah. The sacrifices of the Pakhtoons and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan were taken for granted as they became a part of the partition deal.
Congress acted with opportunism unexpected from a nationalist party and Gandhi became a reticent guide in the crisis that demanded greater participation and concern. His greatness can be assessed in the terms of the great men and moments he lost. Gandhi’s successes presage the success of India and his failings have become the failures of the nation: they explain the Indian national character. Truly, he is the father of the nation
Works Cited
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. India Wins Freedom. Orient Longman: New Delhi.1988
Chandra , Bipin. Modern India : A History Textbook for Class XII. NCERT: New Delhi.1990
Chaudhury, PC Roy. Gandhi and His Contemporaries. Sterling Publishers: New Delhi.1972
Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre.Freedom at Midnight.Vikas Pulication: New Delhi . 1976
Fischer, Louis. The Life of Mahatma Gandhi.Granada: London , Toronto , Sydney , New York.1982
Nirmohi, DeepChandra. Chhoturam ki Kranti Yatra.Sahitya Upkrama: Delhi.2007
Reddy, Krishna . Indian History. Tata Mc Graw-Hill: New Delhi.2003
